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communal uniting of the German people and an assertion of the vitality of Germanic Kultur against the decadent materialistic and individualistic societies of England and France. The war represented a moment of 'resoluteness' for the German people. It entailed a fusion of the past and the future into the intensity of a present moment, involving a decisive experience of historicity. The exigencies of the fighting constituted an 'absolute situation' of self-reckoning in the face of an unconditional demand, exceptionally bringing to a standstill the ever lengthening means-end chains that arise in a modern industrial society dominated by 'objective culture'. The war heralded a purging in the Augean stables of the urbanized money cultures of the West, rooting out all that was ephemeral, superfluous, excessive and inessential in the experience of life.
By March 1915, however, Simmel's writing demonstrates a noticeable shift in emphasis. Although Germany still stands at the forefront of his vision, Germany is at stake for him only because Europe is at stake. Simmel now proclaims that Germany will find its true destiny only in Europe and that it is the European tragedy as a whole that is his motive for writing. In a letter to Friedrich Curtius of 16 March 1915, he declared:
I say this with an anxiety I have never before experienced. I believe that more than any of my contemporaries in the academy, I have worked for 'Europe', and I regard myself as a European -and none the less a good German. That Europe is almost in ruins and that our only hope now is that our children might one day rebuild it -at a stroke, a part of my life's work is reduced to nothing. (editorial quotation in Simmel, 2000: 403) Simmel's thematization of Europe in the last years of his life is reflected in the sequence of the four essays that compose Der Krieg und die geistigen Entscheidungen. The first to appear in the volume is 'Deutschlands innere Wandlung' [Germany's Inner Transformation], a public lecture given originally in Strasburg in November 1914. The second is 'Die Dialektik des deutschen Geistes' [Dialectic of the German Spirit], published originally in September 1916. The third is 'Die Krisis der Kultur' [The Crisis of Culture], a lecture given originally in Vienna in January 1916. The last is 'The Idea of Europe', first published on 7 March 1915. According to the description of the first edition of the book by the publisher Duncker and Humblot, which Simmel authorized, the volume showed 'with the force of a visionary insight', [the] transformations in the [author's] judgement of the war and the world situation from the complete inner confidence of the great time of the first winter in the first essay through to the reserved thoughts on the positive audit of war in the last essay 'The Idea of Europe'. (editorial quotation in Simmel, 1999: 429) In other words, the composition of the book suggested that Germany's 'inner transformation' found its meaning in the idea of Europe as the only possible framework of salvation for the 'crisis of culture' and the 'dialectic of the German spirit'. In Simmel's vision, Europe represented a challenge to individual nations to rise above themselves without at the same time wholly repudiating themselves as national substances. The wider European whole was to mediate between European Journal of Social Theory 8(1) 6 4 P r o o f o n l y nationalist narrow-mindedness and abstract 'internationalism'. By 'internationalism' Simmel appears to have meant some form of liberal cosmopolitanism in the tradition of eighteenth-century rationalism. In an analogous manner to Edmund Burke's view of the French Revolution or to Hegel's critique of Kant's political philosophy, Simmel argued that such abstract universalism fails to gain purchase on the concrete ethical life of the individual nations to which it is addressed. 'In its grotesquely heightened form', he wrote, internationalism 'is mere globetrotting . . . a hotchpotch, a characterless, indiscriminate mêlée of interests and ideas, at most something abstracted from many nations by disregarding their particular individual values'. Internationalism 'is an altogether secondary phenomenon, arising from a simple process of either addition or subtraction'. 'Europeanism' [Europäertum] , on the other hand, is an idea, an altogether primary phenomenon not attainable by abstraction or accumulation -however late its appearance as a historical force. It does not exist in between individual nations, it exists beyond them, and is thus perfectly compatible with any individual national life. This ideal 'Europe' is the locus of spiritual values which the contemporary cultured man reveres and which can be his if his nationality is an inalienable possession without being a blinkering limitation. (Simmel, 1976: 268-9) The idea of Europe, which subsumes the subtlest essence of what is intellectually mature without cutting it off from its national roots, as internationalism does, cannot be pinned down by logic or in terms of specific content. Like other 'ideas', it is not capable of tangible proof, but is accessible only to intuition, albeit intuition which can only be the reward of lengthy pursuit of the cultural values of the past and the present. (Simmel, 1999: 55-6) Internationalism had its closest embodiment for Simmel in Woodrow Wilson's emerging plan for a League of Nations under the beneficent guardianship of the USA. In a similar manner to Ernst Troeltsch, who also promulgated ideas of Europe and 'Europeanism' in the early years of the Weimar Republic, Simmel looked to alternative agencies of transnational association capable of breaking with nationalist myopia without cancelling the residues of national selfunderstanding that give concrete meaning to universal norms and that reconcile the general with the particular (see Troeltsch, 2002; Harrington, 2004) .
The catastrophe of the war for Simmel was not so much that it destroyed Europe's position of supremacy in world politics and world culture. Rather, it was that it unravelled the centuries-long work of ideal self-cultivation that had made Europe the densely interwoven cultural construction that it was. Simmel appears to have thought of Europe by analogy with the selfhood of the person who forms him-or herself in a labour of self-overcoming and self-limitation, constantly trying to draw together the fibres of his or her personality into an organic whole. As the self is a point of intersection and interaction in complex webs of affiliation, so Europe was to be seen as an ideal unity forged from constant exchange and reciprocity, a locus of interconnection between 'life', on the one hand, and its multiple 'forms' and 'objectivations', on the other. The war destroyed this shared Harrington Introduction to Georg Simmel's Essay 6 5 04EST8-1 Harrington (JB/D) 16/11/04 12:09 pm Page 65 P r o o f o n l y heritage of acts of historical national self-overcoming. Simmel names Bismarck, Darwin, Wagner, Tolstoy, Nietzsche and Bergson as personalities who 'have been to an extreme degree men of national character' but who have become 'creators of "Europe" by developing specifically national qualities to their extreme limits' (Simmel, 1999: 56) . Simmel names these elite male figures not because he views them as exhaustive icons but because their legacies stand for diverse political and intellectual challenges to national self-understandings in a cross-European context. (In the 1915 version of the essay he had named only the German figures of Goethe, Beethoven, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. In the 1917 edition he subsequently altered this list.)
Simmel's choice of the word 'idea' in the title of the essay has a definite significance in this last connection. In Simmel's view, there was no concept of Europe that might correspond to some definite bundle of empirical properties. Europe was an 'idea' in the sense that it had no existence in phenomenal reality other than as the semblance of something requiring a labour of imaginary mental construction. Otthein Rammstedt has suggested that Simmel's formulation invites comparison with Hans Blumenberg's conception of 'work on myth'. Europe in this sense is a work of mythical self-construction. The construction of European culture is analogous to personal self-realization as a labour of becoming the self that one already is, 'ideally', but not yet really (see Blumenberg, 1985; Simmel, 2000b; Rammstedt, 2005) .
One of the clearest influences on Simmel in these writings is Nietzsche's famous references to the 'good Europeans' as creatures of 'homelessness'. In The Gay Science and Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche had railed against any 'eternalization of the European system of many petty states', against the 'national scabies of the heart and blood poisoning with which European peoples nowadays delimit and barricade themselves against each other as if with quarantines' (Nietzsche, 2001b: 242) . The following passages from Nietzsche are especially apposite to Simmel: We who are homeless are too diverse and racially mixed in our descent, as 'modern men', and consequently we are not inclined to participate in the mendacious racial self-admiration and obscenity that parades in Germany today. (Nietzsche, 2001b: 242) Whatever term is used these days to try to mark what is distinctive about the European, whether it is 'civilization' or 'humanization' or 'progress' . . .; behind all the moral and political foregrounds that are indicated by formulas like these, an immense physiological process is taking place and constantly gaining ground -the process of increasing similarity between Europeans, their growing detachment from the conditions under which climate-or class-bound races originate, their increasing independence from that determinate milieu where for centuries the same demands would be inscribed on the soul and the body -and so the slow approach of an essentially supra-national and nomadic type of person who, physiologically speaking, is typified by a maximal degree of the art and force of adaptation. This process of the European in a state of becoming can be slowed down in tempo through large-scale relapses . . . The still-raging storm and stress of 'national feeling' belong here, as does the anarchism that is just approaching. (Nietzsche, 2001a: 133-4) European Journal of Social Theory 8(1) 6 
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We find an explicit echo of Nietzsche's anti-Germanism in Simmel's essay on the 'dialectic of the German spirit'. Simmel speaks of Germany as finding its true calling only in confrontation with which it is not, in the Latin civilizations of the Mediterranean -such as in Goethe's Italy, in Hölderlin's Greece, in Nietzsche's France, as well in Hegel's epic odyssey of the mind, The Phenomenology of Spirit. Simmel reiterates that Europeanism is 'no mere external pendant to the German character' but part of Germany's 'innermost vital essence', and that just as it is the essence of life to reach beyond life, as the spirit is most fully itself when it touches that which is more than spirit . . . the very essence of the German mind [is] to reach out beyond what is German. (Simmel, 1976 (Simmel, : 270, 1999 In the second essay from July 1915, 'Europe and America in World History', Simmel extends these reflections to a consideration of Europe's future in a world marked by the ever-growing power of the USA. It should be noted that Simmel narrowly escaped a summons by the Rector of Strasburg University after publication of this essay at the instigation of the Imperial Army for 'un-German behaviour'. It can be surmised that in the absence of the threat of censorship, his anti-nationalist statements in this essay and other late writings might have been even more sharply formulated.
The immediate occasion for the essay was the news of deliveries of munitions by the USA to England in the early months of 1915. Simmel reports his experience of a conversation with a Frenchman who had declared that as Germany and France tore themselves to pieces, England sat ready in waiting at the table. Simmel tells us that it is not England but America who sits in waiting. He reasons that America would have sent arms to any of the warring powers if it could have done so; America had no exclusive relationship to England. President Wilson had himself said that America's neutrality meant that it would have sent arms either to any European country or to none of them. But it was clearly in America's strategic interest to pursue the former rather than the latter policy. It was in America's interest as a rising world power to exacerbate Europe's flow of blood. Wilson had himself said that America had to act for America. Simmel argued that in this sense it was America's mission to act not against any European power but against all the European powers. 'Europe stands on the point of committing suicide', he wrote, 'and America here sees a chance to place itself at the head of world events.'
It waits in the wings, like a lurking heir at the death-bed of the rich father . . . As Europe dispatches to America a not insignificant portion of its strenuously acquired fortune, it blows itself up with its purchases and hands over to America the accession to the throne of world domination. The munitions deliveries . . . are the first great practical manoeuvre with which America hopes to turn the hands on the clock of world history toward the West. America deals the European peoples the weapons with which they are to destroy themselves to its advantage, and gets itself paid for them in immeasurable riches. At a stroke, America contrives Europe's enervation in two ways: a masterpiece of world-historical speculation! (below, p. 000)
No reader can fail to be struck by the emphatic 'anti-Americanism' of Simmel's tone in this essay. The image of America as a 'lurking heir at the death-bed of the Harrington Introduction to Georg Simmel's Essay 6 7 P r o o f o n l y rich father' is a striking one, with almost Oedipal connotations. We are reminded perhaps of the figure of Edmund in the house of the insane King Lear, a usurper of the crown of civilization, a bastard son ready to accede to the throne of world supremacy. In an echo of The Philosophy of Money, Simmel suggests a kind of world-historical transaction in which Europe hands over to America the value of Culture -Europe's 'strenuously acquired fortune' -which America converts into the value of Money and sends back to Europe in the form of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
It should, however, be emphasized that America is as much a symbol for Simmel as the name of a definite nation-state, and that, as such, America features in his writing in the role of something than merely a crude political enemy. It can be argued that just as Simmel is 'elitist' about culture only insofar as he regards culture as a challenge to the self that is necessarily a work of strenuous difficulty, so he is 'anti-American' only insofar as America figures in his writing as the archetypal cipher of any modern mass industrial society -as the cipher of a modern future which might, in principle, find its site of realization on any continent, including Europe. It can be argued that America for Simmel is the foil onto which Europe projects its own self-criticism. America is the figment of Europe's anxieties about its own experiences of industrialization, individualism, materialism, bureaucracy and democracy. In this sense, Simmel writes in a tradition of European intellectualism reaching back to Montesquieu, de Tocqueville and Mill, in whose writings we find an image of America as the increasingly massified majoritarian society that Europe herself could be and is fast becoming.
This reading gains added credence when we consider that at the end of the essay, Simmel seeks to ward off any impression of European chauvinism and complacency by warning that 'for far too long we have assumed the course of world history to unfold on Europe's shores alone, the crests of its waves leaving Asia millennia in the past and now coming to rest for ever on our continent' (below, p. 000). With astonishing prescience, Simmel senses the dawn of a new American century. But he senses this American century neither as an ineluctable fate in which Europe must acquiesce at all costs nor as a hostile demon to be banished by Europeans as entirely alien to their own future. In a very revealing letter to Graf Hermann Keyserling of 25 March 1918, Simmel draws all these thoughts together in the following words:
Not only the reality but also the idea of Europe has disappeared. For Europe is after all not a timeless idea like humanity or beauty but an historical idea . . . One could accept this with the hope that Europe will grow again in many decades and perhaps in a different shape -if there were no America. For I am convinced that in the last instance this war will be waged to the advantage of America . . . I am convinced that the finger of world history is now pointing to the West, just as it once turned from Asia to Europe. I am convinced there will come a time when Europe will be to America as Athens to the later Romans: a travel destination for the young in search of culture, a place of full of interesting ruins and great memories, a source of supplies for artists, scholars and chattering intellectuals [Klugschwätzer] . It is the delusion of our enemies European Journal of Social Theory 8(1) 6 8 P r o o f o n l y not to see that by prolonging the war, they impose on America the role of tertius gaudens, not to see that any peace treaty of any kind -favourable or unfavourable for the individual parties -would lessen this tremendous danger, and that every grenade that America delivers to England will sooner or later hit England herself in the heart. I am not even of the opinion that this fate is entirely inevitable. If Europe manages to recover after the war, if the thought spreads that this war is a common predicament for all parties and that the healing of its wounds must be a common task in which all might assist each other -then I think Europe could still be a match for America, at least for the foreseeable future. But as things stand today, with such hate and with still further self-annihilation planned for the peace, I see no solution.
One 
Europe and America in World History
Georg Simmel
Translated by Austin Harrington
When one tries to make sense of the world-historical transformations produced by this war, America's behaviour takes on a deeper meaning than the munitions deliveries might at first suggest. It is hard for us to imagine our relationship to America today in a way that might reflect more than momentary excitations. For in addition to our Germanness, we also have to think of ourselves as a European state, sharing a certain unity with all other European states. We manage this only with great difficulty when we persist in regarding the battle against almost all of Europe as our highest priority and most passionate resolve. But we must make this undertaking. For all German-American interests return to the fact that Germany lies not only in Germany but also in Europe. As paradoxical as it may sound at present, I am convinced that Europe composes a unity in relation to other parts of the world -only that where once this European factor possessed a kind of solidarity, today it appears so-to-speak only under a minus sign. Europe is dismembering itself, hatefully at struggle with itself.
Some months ago, in one of the neutral countries, I met with a Frenchman active in some important missions to discuss the question of our civilian prisoners in France. The Frenchman declared his readiness to work for improvements in the conditions of some of the confined Germans. I took it for granted that the conversation would not touch on politics. But just as he was taking his leave, the Frenchman said to me: 'Do you want to know my opinion? Germany and France are devouring themselves to pieces while England sits ready in waiting at the table.' I do not criticize this remarkable observation from an intellectually high-standing and thoroughly patriotic Frenchman. But what it suggests about Harrington Introduction to Georg Simmel's Essay 6 9 P r o o f o n l y inner-European relations threatens to take on a truth for all of Europe's relationship to America. Europe stands on the point of committing suicide, and America here sees a chance to place itself at the head of world events. It waits in the wings, like a lurking heir at the death-bed of the rich father. The munitions deliveries put this attitude into effect. As Europe dispatches to America a not insignificant portion of its strenuously acquired fortune, it blows itself up with its purchases and hands over to America the accession to the throne of world domination. The munitions deliveries are not to be seen in this light as merely lucrative private transactions for the individual suppliers, apparently tolerated by a noninterfering state. Rather, they are the first great practical manoeuvre with which America hopes to turn the hands on the clock of world history toward the West. America deals the European peoples the weapons with which they are to destroy themselves to its advantage, and gets itself paid for them in immeasurable riches. At a stroke, America contrives Europe's enervation in two ways: a masterpiece of world-historical speculation! I believe it is quite mistaken to attribute America's actions to its partisanship for England. In some individual cases this may be correct; a craze for all things English [Engländernarretei] certainly seems to prevail over there. A fine old Englishman once confessed to me that he could not bear Americans because, he said, 'they are too English.' Some American families' passions for tracing their family trees to passengers of The Mayflower symbolize this idealization. But America's last motives for its actions are pitted against Germany only because they are pitted against Europe -and they are pitted against this Europe of which England, too, is, in the end, a part! America's partisanship for England is little more than an epiphenomenon of the current situation. Undoubtedly it would deliver arms with the same zeal to the continental powers if it thought it possible and necessary. For then it would help Europe to self-destruction all the more assuredly. President Wilson has himself said that the principles of neutrality mean that arms deliveries can proceed to all parties indifferently, and that consequently he would be breaking neutrality if he declined to send arms to England and France. Of course, if he forbade arms deliveries altogether, this too would affect all parties in just the same indifferent way and would fulfil exactly the same principles of strictest impartiality. However, the latter alternative would considerably dam up Europe's bloodshed on both sides of its self-inflicted wounds. For it is obvious that one party's deployment will induce another party to make a matching campaign. Thus America has seized on a mode of operation absolutely consonant with its formal neutrality which also allows it to realize the humanitarian ideals [Humanitätsideale] it has been preaching incessantly. I have no doubt that numerous leading Americans hold dearly to these ideals and would not betray them for short-term business gain. But consciously or not, one motive rules in their hearts, which the President has expressed quite correctly: America must act neither for nor against any of the war parties; America must act for America. In world-historical terms, in other words, America must intensify this war not against any one party but against all of them, against Europe as a whole. 
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But can Europe be so foolish as to commit this Harikiri? Has the particularism of its parts so blinded the war's perpetrators that we overlook Europe's enormous existential danger, letting our orders for arms satisfy America's business to an infinite degree? We may hope that Germany will emerge healthier and stronger from this war and recover its losses in plenty -excepting its irreplaceable people. But whatever the outcome, Europe herself will be immeasurably weakened. Let us only recall the loss of prestige now suffered by Europeans in Africa and in the entire Orient, which perhaps will never again be made good. From the outset, confusions of thought have been compounded by a very widespread lack of clarity about the quite different levels of significance on which this war is to be played out. With France we have a local feud. As much as Germany must hold on to Alsace to the last man, and will do so, it is a matter of near indifference in world-historical terms as to whether these 14,000 square kilometres of Alsace-Lorraine (in territory and population equal to about one-fortieth of Germany) are to be deemed German or French -almost as indifferent as the question of whether the Trentino belongs to Austria or to Italy. One of the war's paradoxes is that it has claimed most victims on the front between us and those people [the French] whose conflict with us has the least wide-ranging meaning. Russia's and especially England's reasons for war certainly approach the 'threshold' of world-historical significance more closely. But pace many of our best and deepest thinkers, I do not believe any of the speculations pointing to an inevitability or inner necessity in this regard. Nothing persuades me that the world has no place for both England and Germany. At most we can ask that England give up the most short-sighted form of its egoism, but not its egoism itself -no one can expect this of it. Together we could preserve peace in Europe if we had a will to do so -and we could do so not for the sake of some pacifist ideal about whose value we will likely dispute but rather for the sake of holding Europe's position in the world -which must also include England's positionagainst the rising powers of America and perhaps also of east Asia.
Between these two poles a strong Europe might effect an 'equilibrium'. But after the current self-mutilation, we may well ask whether this is still possible. Will Europe be able to prevent one of these powers from coming to dominate over the other and making itself for a period of world history the engine of all the earth's economic and cultural forces? Some decades ago, with his incomparably broad historical sense, Jacob Burckhardt wrote that the European nations have placed far too much trust in the 'security of their relations'. For far too long we have assumed the course of world history to unfold on Europe's shores alone, the crests of its waves leaving Asia millennia in the past and now coming to rest for ever on our continent. After this enduring stability, in the course of which each nation needed to attend so to speak only to its immediate personal interests, we have lost a sense for truly world-historical decisions. The disaster of this inner-European war is that its acute afflictions and sufferings raise Europe's inwardness to unparalleled heights at just the moment that this inwardness threatens us with an unprecedented world-historical danger. In the end Europe dwells in one house, America in another. The myopia, the lunacy and the crime Harrington Introduction to Georg Simmel's Essay 7 1 P r o o f o n l y of our opponents who have ignited this war is that, like the inhabitants of a house who detest each other and want to expel each other, they set fire to the entire house and bring crashing to the ground their very own home.
Beyond the Crisis of Old Europe? A Critique of Ulrich Beck's Kosmopolitisches Europa
This third part of the paper is a section of draft text from the last chapter of my book in which I examine several contemporary statements about European identity in light of the work of the earlier twentieth-century European social thinkers. The main author under consideration is the contemporary German sociologist, Ulrich Beck.
NB: unpolished draft text in need of stylistic and syntactic tidying-up ! --------------------
In several recent contributions Ulrich Beck argues that ongoing processes of global interaction among European states over the last 30 years have led to a new "cosmopolitanism" in European self-understanding. 1 (23), mobilizing the metaphor of the "container-view" or "container-mentality" which must be replaced through a shift to the paradigm of "networks, flows, processes and mobilities".
Researchers betray an "astonishing naivety" he claims, in observing the dramatic political changes in Europe's national boundaries since 1989 while continuing to treat "questions of panEuoepan societal dynmaincs" as matters of "internal inequalities and conflicts within and between nation-states" (2) . The new Europe, he says, displays distinctively "horizontal" features of transnational interdependency and variable boundary movements that go beyond the standardly researched domains of institutional architecture. As Europe switches from being predominantly a land of emigration to a land of immigration, a new combinatory culture arises that reveals "new variable kinds of relations between the inside and the outside" (). As national societies and economies become knitted together with one another in more and more dense patterns, "new shadow realities" come to abound that revolve around new "both-and" combinations and replace older redundant "either-or" dichotomies with respect to language, identity, education and group membership. This "de facto" cosmopolitanism, Beck argues, needs to be rigorously distinguished from the normative cosmopolitanism of eighteenth-century European philosophers. It differs strikingly from nineteenth-century cultural Bürgertum and is not confined to elites. It has occurred in a manner that "no cosmopolitan philosopher could have imagined or held possible:
without a public sphere, without an intention, decision or political programme, in a thoroughly unformed way, though the back door of unintended consequences, undesired, unnoticed, more or less compelled" ().
Beck proposes that the new cosmopolitanism consists in the way Europeans increasingly experience a need to stand outside themselves and look at themselves from afar, as members of a "province" rather than denizens of the "centre". The cosmopolitan view, he says, "forces us to look at Europe from an outsider's perspective, de-centred, and so in this way bring about a provincialization of Europe" (17). This provincialization, he adds, needs to be understood as "exogenous, not endogenous", as being forced upon Europe from the outside, against the grain of its own categories. Insofar as Europeans have "no privileged access to the theorization of their own continent", he argues, any "social theory of Europeanization must therefore open itself to global dialogue from the start". We must look on Europeanization as "a specific case of regional globality" marked by "variable inner-outer relations" and a "contradictory border politics" (19).
Europeanization must be understood "in the paradox of illimitable limited globality" (20), in an acknowledgement that "there is no royal road to modernization -no royal European road, nor
American road -, only de-centred projects of multiple modernities that raise questions for each other" (20).
Beck maintains that empirically modernity has not turned out to be the integrated phenomenon that classical sociological theorists expected it to be. Everywhere, he says, the advance of industrialization brought about not unification and integration but re-segmentation, fracturing, global interdependences, unpredictable recursive effects of peripheries upon erstwhile centres, Rumsfeldian "unknown unknowns". Linked to this, he says, has been an "uncoupling of legitimacy from domination" in the sense of a shortfall in the claims of nation-states to monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. New forms of "trans-legal authority" [translegale Herrschaft] have emerged that are "neither legal nor illegal, neither legitimate nor illegitimate" yet are being "practised on an ever more global scale". It is "precisely because of the way these developments elude our ideas of global order", Beck argues, that "the concepts and theories that so-to-speak embody modernity's claim to order are blind for these circulatory processes of real cosmopolitanization" (18).
Beck contends that older European theories of society rested on a monological conception of global order that expected the world to conform to its own conceptual dictates. The cardinal ideologues of primary modernity were such master thinkers as Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Smith, Hume, and Herder. All of these figures, he claims, "projected a vision of the unity of the world conceptually, long before they could possibly experience the world as such a whole".
Today, in contrast, "we experience the unity of the world in its fracturing and endangering long before we know how we should think it". Today, he says, "we experience unity in its breakdown and as breakdown". "Classical world-historical analyses assumed a knowable and even known world-unity, a conceptual Hegelianism, which sought to pre-dictate reality [ These propositions lead Beck to make a further claim about the contemporary redundancy of older European discourses of "crisis". Transnationalization and hybridization, he declares, are to be seen today as so routine as to make talk of 'crises of identity' redundant, mere "chimeras", he says, "generated by a … false ontology of separate mutually exclusive cultures".
Gone today, he says, is the "old European metaphysic whose basso continuo was the search for substance, constancy and an essential core" (9) . It is time to bid adieu to any "much lamented 'vacuum of meaning', or fear of 'decadence', or anxieties about the retreat of a "metaphysical image of 'man' and 'the' European West". "Only a non-anthropological, anti-ontological, radically open, procedurally determined, and therefore politically pragmatic image of peoples and cultures earns the label 'European'" (48):
"What is experienced in Europe as a "crisis" of the European project is not a European crisis. "Crisis" and "Europe" are indeed almost tautological concepts -perhaps the real crisis of Europe is the crisis of the concept of "crisis". What appears from the nation and state-centred horizon as a 'problem' and 'collapse' can be read from a cosmopolitan perspective as liberation from the imperialism of modernization. In this context, to speak of 'crisis' can come close to self-pitying cultivation of historical traumata." (17). "Everywhere the question arises, latently or openly, how unity and coherence becomes possible in a world of multiple modernities? What accordingly appears in Europe as a 'European crisis" turns out to be as a world-historical switch of perspective."
Beck adds that in the context of remembrance of the Holocaust, the plea for a shedding of the old European "crisis consciousness" involves a new and more sober attitude to European history that is less obsessed with its own heroism. The act of remembering needs to put behind itself all comforting discourses of "tragedy", as well as all flirtations with nihilism and postmodernism.
The hubris of European history can be followed neither by grandiose pessimism nor by a gay cynicism. Beck declares that where Weber "identified Calvinist 'innerworldly asceticism' as an essential moment of the 'capitalist spirit' and saw in this ethos the power to intervene in the received world order and to transform it", "similarly we can say that the 'European spirit' arises from an inner-historical asceticism, from a remembering gaze into the abysses of European civilization." (9) .
In much of this account, readers will recognize the familiar language of Beck's earlier thesis of "reflexive modernization". Beck indeed speaks explicitly of a new "trans-and multinational identity" in Europe that correlates with an age of "reflexive" "second modernity", superseding an older "mono-national identity" in Europe's experience of "primary modernity" (8) . Perhaps it is not too uncharitable to say that Beck's recent work proffers little more than a dressing up of the reflexive modernization thesis in a more modish vocabulary appropriate for EU enlargement after May 2004 and the ratification of the Constitution. In the following pages I
shall raise a few points of contention with this thesis. I defend four basic fronts of opposition to Beck's thesis under the following heads: (1) the notion of "methodological cosmopolitanism" as a "paradigm shift"; (2) the linkage of cosmopolitanism to "second modernity"; (3) the linkage of Eurocentrism to "primary modernity"; and (4) the assertion of the redundancy of ideas of "crisis"
Methodological cosmopolitanism as a "paradigm shift"?
A first dubious element of Beck's thesis turns on precisely what he means by "methodological cosmopolitanism". Certainly it is clear that there are limitations with the way of thinking described as "methodological nationalism". Certainly it is clear that we cannot think of EUbuilding in the way that -for example -Reinhardt Bendix spoke of "nation-building". However, what is less clear is (1) exactly how serious these limt9aitons are, and (2) in what sense, if at all, they entail some wholly new switch toward the mode of theorizing that Beck dubs "methodological cosmopolitanism". The concept of "methodological cosmopolitanism" in Beck's writing is very loosely and indeterminately defined, -so vaguely, in fact, that it is capable of being stretched to hold whatever Beck would like to fit into it. Furthermore, the fact that Beck frequently slides from comments on "methodological nationalism" to comments on "classical sociology" to comments on "old European" to comments on "societal social theory" does little to secure the consistency of his argument. When Beck counsels against the return of a rogue new "general European theory of society" that is in danger of "repeating the mistakes of methodological nationalism at the European level" (16), he does not tell us what such a theory might look like, apart from a passing reference to Luhmann -an ironic reference since Luhmann himself spoke of a transition beyond "old European thinking", making similarly couched claims about the end of "master signifiers", "master subjects", "master observation points" and the like.
What would replace old European societal social theory in Beck's imaginary, it seems, would be something like his own brand of feuilletonistic theorizing where jejune catchwords and rhetorical oxymorons play proxy for concepts. Much of the argument relies on an over-extended appeal to the notion of a "paradigm switch", full of Wittgensteinian pathos for illusions generated by language that require linguistic therapy. 2 Arguably the most serious problem with Beck's call for a "paradigm shift" is that it is effectively a form of petitio principii, a circular question-begging argument that obliges us to accept its conclusion before we can begin to argue with its premise. On one level Beck argues that historical special changes have brought about a transformation in European people's categorial self-understanding. On another level he argues that only once we affirm this revision in our categorical self-understanding will we see the true nature of the changes that have taken place. In a somewhat Hegelian flourish, the argument itself is meant to have the character of reflexivity, attempting to account for its own conditions of possibility in terms of the phenomena to which it refers. In practice, however, the argument constantly threatens to lapse back into vicious circularity. Prior acceptance of the notion of "methodological cosmopolitanism" in Beck's writing would appear to be a precondition of our very ability to observe the empirical changes that supposedly lend it support. It is in this way that Beck can alternate repeatedly from an empirical claim that national societies do not exist any longer to a conceptual claim that they do not exist period.
A further problem with the thesis is that just as the argument vacillates between observation and theory, so it is also ambiguous between observation and normative prescriptionoften to the point of implying that what ought to be the case already is the case. As with much of Beck's work since The Risk Society, there is a constitutive ambivalence in his writing between reflexive modernization as historical narrative and reflexive modernization as a value or norm that Europeans should be practising as a matter of principle. At one moment, it appears in his writing as something that steadily increases in historical actuality, in the transition from "primary" to "secondary" modernity; at another moment it appears as something we should all be actively cultivating, as a matter of normative prescription. This vacillation is already a problem for Habermas's conception of the advance of communicative rationality, and in Beck's more empirical re-casting of Habermasian ideas it is particularly troubling. response cannot be debunked simply as a defensively Europeanist reaction formation. 4 In the present context I defend two main claims against Beck. First, with respect to so-called "second modernity", I argue that there are more issues of continuity, solidity and structural constancy and more issues of value antagonism and metaphysical substance in contemporary European selfunderstanding than he would appear to imagine. Second, with regard to so-called "primary modernity", I argue that there are, or were, more dimensions of "reflexivity" and internal critical self-transformation among early twentieth-century European intellectuals than he would appear to accept. 5 Certainly on one level, Beck is right to draw a distinction between contemporary lived social experiences of cosmopolitanization that have a relatively broad-based popular dimension to them and the older "philosophical" cosmopolitanism of elite intellectuals. Diderot's, Voltaire's or Catherine the Great's "republic of letters" was not sociologically cosmopolitan in any significant sense, if by 'sociological' we understand some magnitude of popular dissemination.
But still it is misleading to conclude from a comparison with the restricted class basis of the older "elite" "philosophical" cosmopolitanism that the new kind is, by contrast, overwhelmingly "real"
in the sense of effective in popular culture. If it is true to say the new cosmopolitanism is not confined to elites and that it has a widespread effect in popular culture, it is going too far to say that it "effective even against the express will of the wealthy Western countries" and that "it disturbs and destroys the monopoly on which their riches are based" (22). This latter part of the claim tries to draw far too much intellectual capital from the well-known defects of the homogenization/McDonaldization view of globalization and speciously sets up the latter as a straw man.
Similarly, itt is one thing to say that in a globalized "cosmopolitanized" world the centre "ceases to be a future and model for the periphery". It is quite another to speak of an "inversion of the hierarchy of centre and periphery with its attendant global inequalities" (21). Somewhat like Hardt and Negri, though without their Marxist commitments, Beck indulges in a Dionysian metaphysic of counter-hegemonic undercurrents that grossly underestimates the robustness of the Western power axis. He also speaks wildly of "no fixed reality of structures, interactions and institutions administered through a territorial state", misleadingly implying that "horizontal"
processes of Europeanization are necessarily ones "from below", necessarily grounded in democratic, popular or grass roots-based movements. 6 In an equally dubious passage, he asserts that in "the Europe that is now in flux, the promise of expansion which the old state-and empirebased thinking declaimed [verschrien] as untrammeled imperialism offers to the excluded Europeans and as yet non-EU members a perspective of entry into the inside, moving from a position of threatened and economically underdeveloped land to protected land on the road to greater welfare and democracy" (26). What one must surely object to in this passage is not that East European countries might not stand to gain from EU membership, but rather Beck's blithe dismissal of the relevance of any notion of domination in this context as being somehow conceptually "outmoded".
If we define cosmopolitanism in some vague way as global cultural hybridity, one can surely agree with Beck that it "does not occur under the sign of a new global bourgeoisie and is not the expression simply of high-class tastes" (22). However, the question is whether the semantic sense of the term can be watered down in this way. "Real cosmopolitanization" in Beck's writing often seems to function as little more than a comfortably evasive alternative to the dread word "universalism". By all appearances Beck seems to want to refer to some kind of universal global cultural conversation, where the "cosmopolitan" would seem to mean little more than some kind of state of universal equivalence of cultural particularities. Entirely absent in this conflation of the "universal", the "cosmopolitan" and the "global" is any engagement with the philosophical debates about the logical valencies and differences of these complex terms and with earlier attempts at their resolution, from Hegel and the German idealist philosophers to Weber or Durkheim, as well as Habermas. 7 Like many commentators, Beck asserts that "for a social theory of Europeanization, too, there can be no privileged European point of observation", that we must "necessarily take up an experimental-dialogical perspective that foregrounds global variability, communication and
interdependence", and that in this sense Europeanization should be "conceptualized as a regionalhistorical case of boundary-management within an arena of global interdependence" (22). Here we must ask about precisely what Beck means by "a transnational cosmopolitan observer perspective". The perspective in question is apparently to be both a "new" kind of perspective -a "transnational cosmopolitan" perspective -and yet not a perspective at all. It is to be a standpoint that is not standing anywhere, not down here, from where we are, but somewhere up there, in the ether. It reaches beyond the horizons of the European participants to whom it is addressed, yet it is not necessarily the perspective of any particular group of non-Europeans either: it is some kind of methodological utopianism. As I have argued at many places in this book, we delude ourselves if we believe we can somehow jump out of our skins to some pristine "view from nowhere" (cf Nagel 19 ). The work of figures such as Troeltsch, Husserl, Mannheim, Scheler, Gadamer or Charles Tayor gives us ample demonstration of the conceptual confusions generated by attempts somehow to come closer to the Other by extirpating the standpoint of the Self that is doing the observing. Unlike beck, all of these more classical thinkers draw out the complexities of what it means to be standortsgebunden and what it means exactly to attempt to move beyond one's "standpoint" or "horizon". Derailed by liberal moral ardour, Beck wants to have both situated dialogical participation and disembodied cosmopolitan transcendence at the same time.
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Eurocentrism and "primary modernity"?
In the account of Weimar intellectuals presented in Chapter 5 of this book, I sought to undermine the deterministic retrospective view that would regard the inter-war period of European modernity as being entirely bereft of cultural resources for attitudes of reflexive selfdistanciation. The claim I defend against Beck in the present context is that these earlier instances of cultural reflexivity in European history should make us think twice about the novelty and historical accuracy of the Beck's dichotomous periodization between "primary" and "secondary" modernity. Although the intellectuals in question did not always represent popular or widely held views of the time and thus in this (restricted, etiolated) sense were not always sociologically "representative", they may well have articulated ideas that, far from being "monological" or "Eurocentric", were equally, if not more, sensitive to civilizational differences than the current discourses of figures such as Beck and Eisenstadt or postcolonial critics such as Chakhrabarty.
Beck writes impressionistically of a "world-historical shift of perspective" that begins when "the image of a unified world … is irremediably broken" and a "reversal of tense poles" is effected from a past-oriented, past-celebrating attitude of primary modernity to a decisively future-oriented attitude of secondary modernity. Reading such words one would think that twentieth-century European culture had never experienced any such movements as the Cubists, the Futurists and the Dadaists, or that Einstein's relativity thesis never found its way out of the academy or that back in 1863 Baudelaire had not already spoken of the modern as "the contingent, the fugitive, the transitory" in his famous essay on "The Painter of Modern Life".
Beck's reference to the new Europe in terms of "a concept of process, an experiment in inclusive distinction" manifestly recalls Nietzsche's rhetoric of a "great experimental process of the European in a state of becoming" that became the vogue for the Young European movement of the 1920s. As is well-known, Nietzsche's maxim of thinking against oneself, of viewing oneself from afar, of strategic self-miniaturization was a guiding ethos for numerous European intellectuals and cultural movements of the period -from Musil to Gide and Hermann Broch, among many others. None of these authors would have found anything iconoclastic in Beck's modish apothegm of "unity in its breakdown and unity as breakdown". In numerous thinkers of this period and milieu we find entirely comparable geometrical-spatial metaphors of "decentring" and "Copernican turns", long before the post-Kuhnian vocabulary of "paradigms shifts" of which Beck is so fond. 9 I have argued that these writers we find considerably developed accounts of the fragmented character of modern world understandings that do not at the same time reproduce
Beck's inflated talk of the desuetude of structure, integration, unity, and societal totality. It is for this reason that Beck perpetrates a caricature of classical sociological categories when he asserts that the classical concept of society is "limited, territorial, national, and implies homogeneity", whereas the contemporary concepts of "civil society" and historical "remembrance" are both 'xxxxxxxxxx'.
Beyond the crisis of "old Europe"?
Sociologists and historians will be familiar with the idea of an at once conceptual and etymological link between concepts of "crisis" and concepts of "critique" from Reinhardt from this that if we suggest that the concept of crisis is to be overcome or sublated, we commit ourselves to an assertion of the irrelevance of critique, in the sense of the lack of an object of purchase for our criteria. For Beck, however, this would not appear to be the case.
The import of Beck's claim about the "old European" "crisis consciousness" would seem to amount an assertion of the redundancy of an entire legacy of European philosophical thought.
The claim would presumably extend to such figures of thought as Lukács's "transcendental homelessness" or Hölderlin's and Heidegger's thematic of "homecoming". Perhaps he also has in mind Sartre's, Kojeve's or Bloch's humanist Marxism, or Löwith's and Niebuhr's theological problems of "meaning in history" and historical "redemption". It would seem that on Beck's view all these kinds of motifs are to be unmasked as irretrievably Europcentric and consequently to be "deconstructed" in the "new European cosmopolitanization". Here one recognizes in
Beck's writing a certain appeal to strands of thinking in Derrida's and Foucault's revolt against philosophical humanism, Lyotard's proclamation of the 'end of grand narratives', as well as a version of Habermas's appeal for a paradigm switch toward "post-metaphysical thinking" and "de-transcendentalized reason". In reality, however, the arguments of the philosophers Beck invokes in this regard are considerably more complex than his citation would suggest. To concentrate on just one of these here, we should recall that for Derrida notably, the upshot of
Heidegger's Destruktion of metaphysics was that Heidegger remained entangled in the universe of concept he believed himself to have overcome. The very notion of an 'overcoming' of Western metaphysics for Derrida was itself a notion drenched in metaphysical content, reaching back to Hegelian Aufhebung. Derrida would never have asserted that such ideas are bunk just because they are "anthropological" or "theological" or European in provenance, and Derrida himself made no such claim to escape such conceptuality in his own work. 10 One might submit that the danger of claims such as Beck's is that they open the door to a rather easy-going pragmatism in which normative struggles and conflicts over values and ideals are dissolved into a watery notion of cosmopolitan flows and exchanges, interaction and reciprocity. It is one thing to point to a certain covert or overt pathos of "tragedy" that clouds much of earlier twentieth-century European crisis discourse; it is another matter to suggest that the concept of crisis is to be in some way aufgehoben -"sublated" or "transcended" in some subHegelian sense. We saw in the previous chapter of this book, considerably more than this is at I come now to a last key problem with Beck's argument which concerns his linkage of the issue of crisis consciousness to debates about remembrance of the Holocaust. Here Beck is certainly right on one level in this regard not to follow the kind of pessimistic-fatalistic narrative promulgated by Karl Löwith that could account for developments in European cultural history only in terms of irreversible and inexorable descent into nihilism. And he is also right to discern a certain secret affinity between old European pessimism and the new postmodern nihilism.
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Beyond both nationalism and postmodernism, he says, "Europeanization means struggle [Ringen] for institutional answers to the barbarism of European modernity" and for an "institutionalization of Europe's own path of self-criticism" (36). Yet there is an opposite danger here to which Beck's argument may be susceptible in this attempt to link the "end of the pathos of crisis" to some idea of the "institutionalization of self-critique". Apart from the obvious already mentioned logical tension between these two ideas, there is an additional danger that in the absence of a consciousness of crisis oriented to criteria of collective self-worth, such "institutional" or "institutionalized" reflexivity may deteriorate into routinized normalized practice of some kind.
This danger seems particularly at hand in when beck writes that "transformed into institutionalized remembrance, the break with civilization becomes a tradition and has a traditionbuilding effect" (40). Here we should recognize the pitfalls of a way of practising social theory that wants to play proxy for moral philosophy and regards ethical-metaphysical problems as having social-scientific solutions. There is the possibility that such practices of remembrance may simply be reappropriated in an attitude of sociological functional equivalence for the maintenance of normality and for the return from a state of the pathological to a state of the normal. This problem is a familiar one in the history of social thought that is not specific to Beck but finds a revealing manifestation in his work. What G.E. Moore once described as the "naturalistic fallacy" -the attempt to derive an "ought" from an "is" -was a particular problem in nineteenth-century evolutionary thought from Comte to Spencer which tended to seek to deduce morally salient lessons form observations about changes and progressions in states of social affairs. As is well-known, it was a particular problem for Durkheim's project of grounding However, what he all too easily passes over in this move is the ethical-metaphysical complexity of the problem of crime and forgiveness, all too keenly wanting to press Derrida's deconstruction of Jankelevich into the services of a social-scientific programme. The paradox of forgiving the unforgivable is in no way covered adequately by the sociological slogan of 'reflexive modernization". One does not simply resolve this metaphysical paradox simply by calling it "reflexivity". Beck's language here is at best conceptually obfuscatory. At worst it implies the return of a form of teleological progressivism, where "institutionalized self-critique" becomes a masquerade for self-congratulation. Indeed this danger is not warded off by Beck's flimsy talk of a "quantum leap" from the "paradigm of society" to this "paradigm of remembrance" (38).
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As if aware of these weaknesses, Beck sometimes gives the impression of wanting to back out of some of his own claims. He attacks the salience of the nation-state as an organizing sociological category, but then at other places claims that his asseverations do not impugn the particularistic and provincial in national history. In one place he asserts baldly that "Europeanization has no normative basis", even that "Europe needs no normative basis" (34), and further that "the venture of Europeanization can be undertaken neither in the service of a universal God, nor a universal humanity, nor a universal truth"; that "there is no universalist viewpoint, no universalist spirit, no old or new world spirit" (19). But then he affirms that the Nazi crimes presuppose universal value standards that themselves have their origin in Europe, emphasizing that what postmodernism fails to see is the need to "answer the horror of Europe's history with more Europe" (36). "We combat the European horror with European values and concepts", he says; "the cosmopolitan is a self-critical experimental Europe which is rooted in its history and at the same time breaks with its history and finds the power to break with its history from its history" (36). Europe both breaks with itself and does not break with itself, he seems to be saying. Similarly he says that the peculiarity of European historical experience lies in its inability to give itself a substantive identity. Yet this statement is in performative contradiction with the statement that European identity "does not exist in self-distinction from others, because … recognition of others belongs to the core of our identity" (29) -to describe something as belonging to the "core of our identity" is surely to describe to it as substantial and essential to ourselves. On many occasions like these, Beck seems to want to have his cake and eat,
smuggling back in what at first was supposed to be banished from the account ex hypothesi.
As I have emphasized at several places in this chapter, the politically correct rhetorical trope that holds that Europe's identity consists in not having an identity only raises the question of why, in principle, the inability to give oneself a substantive identity should not be peculiarity for all societies, rather than just Europe. When Beck describes the new "cosmopolitan selfimage" as one of a "horizontally open Europe which draws its self-consciousness from diversity and difference" (26), the question arises as to why such an ethos should be something to which
Europeans alone are answerable. The platitudinous language of "diversity and difference" appears among all the writers discussed in this chapter, and in Beck's text it recurs ad nauseam.
We may note that when Adorno described his philosophy in terms of an interrogation of the "nonidentity of concept and object", he made precisely such a "universalizing" statement about intrinsically inconstant historical constants -yet today Adorno's philosophy is frequently derided as stubbornly Eurocentric. As with many of the contemporary authors reviewed in this chapter,
we must here ask ourselves as to how far European cultural experiences can be defined in this purely negativist fashion. Are all efforts at some form of substantive characterization to be placed under a sign of suspicion as always, inherently, "essentialist"?
---------------
